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INTRODUCTION
“It’s not easy for me to raise my hand and send off a boy to die
without talking about it first.”1
The death penalty has been used as a form of criminal punishment
since the beginning of civilization,2 and has existed in the United
States since the founding of the original colonies.3 In its early days, the
death penalty was used for a variety of crimes, including murder,

 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW Executive Articles Editor, 2015–16; B.S.
in Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, December 2009.
1
12 ANGRY MEN (Reginald Rose, et. al. 1957).
2
The first established death penalty laws were codified in the Code of King
Hammaurabi of Babylon in the eighteenth century B.C. History of the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#america (last visited
Sept. 13, 2015).
3
Origins of Capital Punishment, CRIME MUSEUM,
http://www.crimemuseum.org/crime-library/origins-of-capital-punishment (last
visited Sept. 13, 2015).
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burglary, treason, counterfeiting, and arson.4 This use was limited,
however, by the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.5 Indeed, the
Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights prohibits the infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishment.”6 Thus, the punishment must be
proportional to the crime committed.7 Accordingly, today, the death
penalty is imposed predominantly for the crime of murder,8 with the
view being that the punishment of death “fits the crime” of murder—
an “eye for an eye” if you will.
Over 3000 inmates currently sit on death row in the United
States.9 Sixty-two (62) of these inmates await execution on federal
death row10 in Terre Haute, Indiana.11 Among these inmates is a man
by the name of Bruce Webster.12 Webster has been housed in Terre
Haute since 1996, following his conviction in the Northern District of
Texas for the federal crimes of kidnapping resulting in death,
4

Id.
America’s Tug of War over Sanctioned Death: The U.S. History of Capital
Punishment, Random History (Sept. 19, 2009),
http://www.randomhistory.com/2009/09/19_capital-punishment.html.
6
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)) (“The Eighth Amendment’s protection
against excessive or cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic precept of
justice that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportioned to the
offense.”).
8
Death Penalty for Offenses Other than Murder, Death Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last
visited Sept. 13, 2015). Although capital offenses exist in several states for various
other types of crimes, no one is currently on death row for these crimes. Id.
9
Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
10
Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER
(June 26, 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners.
11
The federal correctional facility in Terre Haute is currently “the only federal
facility which can carry out executions.” Jon Swaner, Why Tsarnaev Was Not Sent to
Terre Haute, WTHI, June 26, 2015, http://wthitv.com/2015/06/26/why-tsarnaevwas-not-sent-to-terre-haute/.
12
Federal Death Row Prisoners, supra note 10.
5

59

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/4

2

Evans: Post-Conviction Relief: The Seventh Circuit Applies Savings Claus

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

conspiring to commit kidnapping, and using and carrying a firearm
during a crime of violence.13 He was sentenced to death on the first
count (kidnapping resulting in death) after the district court dismissed
the argument that he was ineligible for the death penalty because he
suffers from an intellectual disability.14 On direct appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Webster’s death
sentence.15 Several years later, the Fifth Circuit rejected Webster’s
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 225516 as well
as his request for a second collateral review under this same statute.17
Webster then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Seventh Circuit
pursuant to the Savings Clause of Section 2255.18
The Savings Clause has been and continues to be a constant
“source of litigation” in federal courts,19 and was at the heart of
Webster’s plea before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Section 2255 allows for a federal prisoner to vacate his
sentence if it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States.”20 As a general rule, the remedy afforded by Section
2255 functions as a substitute for the writ of habeas corpus.21
13

Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1124–25. The governing statute at the time was 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c),
which makes it unlawful to impose a sentence of death upon a person who is
mentally retarded (now termed “intellectually disability” by the Supreme Court). See
Hall v. Florida., 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
15
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 351 (5th Cir. 1998).
16
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2005).
17
In re Webster, 605 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2010).
18
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135.
19
Nicolas Matterson, Feeling Inadequate?: The Struggle to Define the Savings
Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C. L. REV. 353, 355 (2013).
20
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
21
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. “A writ of habeas corpus is a court order that
commands an individual or government official, usually a prison warden, who has
restrained another to produce the prisoner at a designated time and place so that the
court can determine the legality of custody and decide whether to order the
prisoner’s release.” Habeas Corpus, THE FREE DICTIONARY,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/writ+of+habeas+corpus (last visited
Sept. 13, 2015).
14
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However, Congress has recognized that there might be cases in which
the remedy provided by Section 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of the [prisoner’s] detention,”22 and has, accordingly,
authorized the filing of a traditional writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 in these rare circumstances.23 In Webster v. Daniels, the
Seventh Circuit recognized that Bruce Webster had presented such a
rare case, due largely to the fact that he seeks to offer “newly
discovered” evidence that may demonstrate that he was diagnosed as
intellectually disabled before his arrest and subsequent sentencing.24
As a result of this decision, Webster could have the opportunity to
challenge his death sentence yet again.25
This article will analyze the soundness of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision to allow Bruce Webster to file a writ of habeas corpus
attacking his death sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Part I of
this article discusses the federal statutes at issue in Webster v. Daniels:
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Part II analyzes the factual
and procedural background of Webster v. Daniels. Part III then
examines the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Webster v. Daniels as well
as prior Seventh Circuit cases that address the application of the
Savings Clause. Finally, Part IV considers the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Webster v. Daniels, and argues that this decision, though
commendable in principle, was not supported by prior case law or
sufficient legal justification and is contrary to public policy.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
To fully understand Webster v. Daniels, a brief overview of
federal habeas corpus law is required, specifically Section 2255, since
the conclusion reached in this case turns on the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of this provision. Accordingly, this first Part provides a
brief history of the writ of habeas corpus, leading to the enactment of
22

Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
24
See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1142–44.
25
See id. at 1146.
23
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28 U.S.C. § 2255. It will also discuss the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
2255, with a focus on the Savings Clause.
A. History of Federal Habeas Corpus Review
Habeas corpus is a Latin phrase meaning “to produce the body.”26
Thus, the function of a writ of habeas corpus, often referred to as the
“Great Writ,”27 is to bring a prisoner before the court to determine the
legality of the incarceration or detention.28 It is most often invoked
after conviction and after the exhaustion of direct appeal; it is often a
last resort for prisoners seeking relief.29 The writ of habeas corpus was
developed in England during the thirteenth century, and was later
brought to the colonies, and incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.30
The Suspension Clause, contained in Article I of the Constitution,
provides that “the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety shall require
it.”31
This common law right to habeas corpus was codified for the first
time in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,32 and is currently codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2241.33 Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to grant
writs of habeas corpus “when any person is restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the

26

Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 443, 446 (2007).
27
See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
28
Kovarsky, supra note 26, at 446.
29
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33391, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006).
30
Jennifer L. Case, Note, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e), 103 KY. L.J. 169, 171–72. (2014).
31
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
32
Case, supra note 30, at 173.
33
Jennifer L. Case, Kaleidoscopic Chaos: Understanding the Circuit Courts’
Various Interpretations of § 2255’s Savings Clause, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014).
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United States.”34 This statute provided prisoners with federal habeas
corpus relief for well over a century.35 However, the filing
requirements of the Act eventually became problematic.36
The Habeas Corpus Act required a prisoner to file his or her writ
of habeas corpus in the district of the prisoner’s incarceration.37 This
requirement created two main problems.38 First, those federal districts
with large concentrations of federal prisons were required to handle an
inordinate number of habeas corpus petitions.39 Second, because
habeas courts were “often far from the sentencing court, prisoners had
limited access to relevant records, witnesses, and evidence.”40 To
remedy these problems, Congress proposed new legislation that
required federal prisoners to challenge their convictions in the court
that sentenced them, rather than the court with jurisdiction over their
confinement.41 This legislation, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was
enacted in 1948.42
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Savings Clause
Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to move “to vacate, set
aside, or correct” a federal sentence if “the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”43 A federal
prisoner can also use a Section 2255 motion to argue that: (1) the
sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (2)
34

Case, supra note 30, at 173 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1,
14 Stat. 385, 385–86).
35
Id. at 174 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave et. al., Criminal Procedure §28.2(b)
(3d. ed. 2013)).
36
Id. at 175.
37
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952).
38
Case, supra note 30, at 175.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 175–76.
41
Matteson, supra note 19, at 358–59 (2013) (citing Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213–
14).
42
Id. at 359.
43
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
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the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or, (3)
the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.44
Section 2255 effectively replaced the traditional writ of habeas
corpus provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as the means for a federal
prisoner to challenge a federal criminal sentence.45 In fact, Section
2255 goes so far as to prohibit federal courts from hearing Section
2241 petitions filed by federal prisoners.46 Indeed, the relevant
language of the statute provides that “an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to
the court which sentenced him.”47
Section 2255 enables federal prisoners to bring an initial motion
as a matter of right.48 However, Congress has limited the opportunity
for successive relief under Section 2255 as a result of the societal
interest in the finality of judicial decisions.49 Therefore, prisoners
seeking to bring a second or successive motion pursuant to Section
2255 must satisfy stringent standards before the motion may be
heard.50 Section 2255(h) first requires the prisoner to petition the
appropriate court of appeals51 for an order authorizing the district court
to consider the successive motion.52 A three-judge panel of the court of
appeals then hears this petition.53 The court of appeals may authorize
the filing of a second or successive motion if it contains:
44

Case, supra note 30, at 177 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
Lauren Staley, Note, Inadequate and Ineffective? Factual Innocence and the
Savings Clause of § 2255, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2013) (quoting Wayne R.
LaFave et. al., Criminal Procedure §28.9(a) (3d. ed. 2013)).
46
Case, supra note 33, at 12–13.
47
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
48
See Case, supra note 33, at 14.
49
See Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013).
50
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
51
In other words, the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the sentencing
court.
52
28 U.S.C. § 2244(3)(A).
53
Id. § 2244(3)(B).
45
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(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense;
or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.54
Simply put, if a successive Section 2255 motion fails to introduce
either new evidence demonstrating innocence of the underlying crime
or a new rule of constitutional law previously unavailable to the
prisoner, a court of appeals will not certify the petition.55 As a result,
successive collateral review will be barred, unless the Savings Clause
applies.56
The Savings Clause, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), allows
federal prisoners to file a traditional habeas corpus petition in the
district of incarceration pursuant to Section 2241.57 However, the
Savings Clause only applies when the remedy provided by Section
2255(a) is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the
detention.”58 This provision is often relied upon in cases where the
prisoner filed an unsuccessful motion under Secion 2255(a), and then
was denied the opportunity to file a successive motion pursuant to
Section 2255(h), leaving the Savings Clause as the only means
available to obtain review of a sentence that may be unconstitutional
or illegal.59 The application of the Savings Clause in such

54

Id. § 2255(h).
Staley, supra note 45, at 1152. The grant or denial of an authorization to file
a successive Section 2255 motion is not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(3)(E).
56
Staley, supra note 45, at 1152.
57
Case, supra note 33, at 14.
58
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
59
Matteson, supra note 19, at 362.
55

65
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circumstances is frequently litigated,60 and it is the source of the
dispute among the Seventh Circuit judges in Webster v. Daniels.
CASE BACKGROUND
It is necessary to understand the facts and procedural history of
Webster v. Daniels in order to understand the Seventh Circuit’s holding
in this case. Accordingly, this Part will set forth the facts, detailing the
crimes committed by Webster that ultimately led to his conviction in
the Northern District of Texas. It will also briefly discuss the case’s
disposition in the Texas district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit prior to the collateral attack in the Seventh Circuit.
A. Factual Background
Webster, along with his accomplices Orlando Hall and Marvin
Holloway, ran a drug ring in Pine Bluff, Arkansas in the early 1990s.61
The group purchased marijuana in the Dallas/Fort Worth area with the
help of a local contact, Steven Beckley, and transported it back to
Arkansas to sell.62
On September 21, 1994, Hall flew to Dallas to participate in a
drug transaction.63 In Dallas, Hall and his local contact, Beckley, met
two local drug dealers, Stanford Vitalis and Neil Rene, at a car wash
and gave them $4,700 as an advance payment for marijuana.64 Vitalis
and Rene stated that they would return to the car wash later that day
with the marijuana, but they never appeared.65 Vitalis and Rene
claimed that the money and the car they had been driving were
stolen.66 Hall was suspicious of this story, so he, along with his
60

Id. at 355.
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1125 (7th Cir. 2015).
62
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 317 (5th Cir. 1998).
63
Id.
64
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1125.
65
Id.
66
Id.
61

66
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brother, Demetrious, and Beckley, began to survey Vitalis and Rene’s
apartment.67 When they later saw Vitalis and Rene in the supposedly
stolen vehicle, they deduced that the story about the stolen money was
also false.68
On September 24, 1994, Hall arranged for Webster to fly to
Dallas.69 That night, Hall, Demetrious, Beckley, and Webster went to
Vitalis and Rene’s apartment in a vehicle owned by Hall’s sister.70 The
group approached the apartment and knocked on the door.71 The
occupant, Lisa Rene (the sixteen-year old sister of Neil Rene), refused
to let them in.72 Webster then forcibly entered the apartment, grabbed
Lisa, and dragged her to the car.73 Webster forced Lisa onto the
floorboard of the car, and the group drove to Hall’s sister’s apartment
nearby.74 Once there, they forced Lisa into Beckley’s car and drove
around looking for a secluded spot.75 During the drive, Hall raped Lisa
and forced her to perform fellatio on him.76
Beckley, Demetrious, and Webster eventually decided to drive
Lisa back to Pine Bluff, Arkansas.77 Webster and Demetrious took
turns raping Lisa on the way there.78 Once they arrived in Pine Bluff,
the men rented a motel room, where they tied Lisa to a chair and
continued to sexually assault her.79

67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1998).
72
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 2015).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1998).
77
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1126.
78
Id.
79
Id.
68

67
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The next day, Hall and Holloway arrived at the motel.80 They
decided that Lisa “knew too much.”81 Later that afternoon, Hall and
Webster went to a nearby park, and dug a grave.82 Webster, Hall, and
Beckley took Lisa to the park the next morning.83 They covered her
eyes with a mask, and led her to the grave site.84 At the grave site, Hall
turned Lisa’s back to the grave, placed a sheet over her head, and then
hit her in the head with a shovel.85 Lisa screamed and tried to run
away, but Beckley grabbed her and hit her in the head twice with the
shovel.86 Webster and Hall then took turns hitting her with the
shovel.87 Webster then gagged her, dragged her to the grave, stripped
her, poured gasoline on her, and shoveled dirt over her.88 Shortly
thereafter, Hall, Demetrious, Beckley and Webster were arrested for
this horrific crime.89
B. Procedural History
Webster was convicted in the Northern District of Texas on
charges of kidnapping in which death occurred, conspiracy to commit
kidnapping, and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence.90 He was sentenced to death on the first count.91

80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1998).
87
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1126.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1126–27.
91
Id. at 1127.
81

68
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Webster challenged this sentence, arguing that he was ineligible
for the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c)92 because he suffers
from an intellectual disability.93 Webster relied on the testimony of
three expert psychologists to support this argument.94 These three
experts maintained that a finding of mental retardation is appropriate if
the person’s I.Q. is roughly 70 or below and if the person has a deficit
in at least one of the three areas of adaptive functioning
(communication, socialization, and daily living skills).95 All three
testified that Webster suffered from a low I.Q. (with scores on I.Q.
tests96 ranging from 59 to 65)97 and had the adaptive functioning of a
six to seven-year old.98
To rebut this testimony, the government offered two of its own
experts, who testified that Webster achieved a score of 72 on a
truncated version of the I.Q. test performed by the government99 and
that Webster had satisfactory adaptive functioning.100 The government
also suggested that Webster may have lied or otherwise manipulated
the tests performed by his experts in order to establish that he was
ineligible for the death penalty.101
This conflicting evidence clearly created a question of fact, and
the district court, weighing this evidence, concluded that Webster was
not intellectually disabled, and, therefore, he was not exempt from the

92

18 U.S.C. § 3956(c) provides that “a sentence of death shall not be carried
out upon a person who is mentally retarded, or a person who lacks the mental
capacity to understand the death penalty due to mental disability.”
93
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132.
94
Id. at 1127.
95
Id.
96
These experts administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)
Test. Id. at 1128. This test is widely used to test I.Q and assesses both verbal and
performance skills. Id.
97
Id. at 1128.
98
Id. at 1129.
99
Id. at 1130.
100
Id. at 1131.
101
Id. at 1128.
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implementation of the death penalty under 28 U.S.C. § 3596(c).102
Webster immediately filed an appeal, but his death sentence was
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.103
In 2005, six years after Webster was sentenced, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, held that the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution—not just federal statutory law—prohibits
the execution of the intellectually disabled.104 Even though the trial
court had previously determined that Webster was not intellectual
disabled, Webster nevertheless filed a motion to vacate his death
sentence in light of Atkins.105 In this motion, brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, Webster argued that his sentence was imposed in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.106 This argument was rejected by
the Fifth Circuit, which held that Webster failed to establish that he
suffered from an intellectual disability at trial and that, accordingly,
the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was proper,
regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins.107
Following this decision, “nothing of legal significance happened
in Webster’s case for four years.”108 In 2009, though, Webster returned
to the Fifth Circuit and, with the aid of new counsel, again attempted
to get his sentence vacated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.109 With this
second Section 2255 motion, Webster sought to introduce newly
discovered evidence purportedly revealing that he had been diagnosed
as intellectually disabled a year before the commission of the crimes
for which he was convicted.110 His motion for certification was denied
102

Id. at 1131.
Id.
104
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of
mentally retarded criminals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
105
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2005).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 313.
108
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1133.
103

70
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by the Fifth Circuit, which held that Webster’s proposed new evidence
“did not meet the stringent standards imposed by Section 2255(h)” for
successive motions.111 The Fifth Circuit first concluded that Section
2255(h)(1) was not applicable because it requires the prisoner to
present evidence that he could not be found guilty of the underlying
offense.112 However, Webster did not seek to offer evidence of his
innocence; rather, he sought to challenge his sentence.113 The Fifth
Circuit also concluded that Section 2255(h)(2) was inapplicable
because it requires a new rule of constitutional law that was previously
unavailable, and Atkins had already been decided at the time of
Webster’s initial Section 2255 motion.114
When certification of his successive Section 2255 petition was
denied, Webster filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, where
Webster then currently resided on death row in Terre Haute.115 Webster
argued that he was permitted to bring a traditional habeas corpus
petition under Section 2255(e).116 Section 2255(e)—or the “Savings
Clause”—allows federal prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus when the remedy provided by Section 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”117 The district court
found that Webster did not qualify for relief under the Savings Clause
on the basis that the Clause applies only to changes in the law, not to
new or additional facts.118 Webster appealed the district court’s denial
of his habeas corpus petition to the Seventh Circuit.119 A panel of the
111

Id. at 1134.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1135. “The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to
file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(E).
116
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135.
117
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Matteson, supra note 19, at 359.
118
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135.
119
Id.
112
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial of
Webster’s Section 2241 petition de novo.120 The panel affirmed the
district court decision, concluding that new evidence can never satisfy
Section 2255(e).121 However, the full court vacated that decision and
reheard the case en banc.122 This decision led to the controversial
opinion that is the subject of this article.
DISCUSSION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN
WEBSTER V. DANIELS
This Part will discuss Seventh Circuit case law interpreting the
Savings Clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Part will then examine the
majority opinion, with a focus on how the majority interpreted and
applied the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels. Finally, this Part will
consider the dissenting opinion in Webster v. Daniels.
A. Prior Seventh Circuit Interpretations of the Savings Clause
The Savings Clause allows a federal prisoner to file a habeas
corpus petition under Section 2241 when the remedy provided by
Section 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.”123 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never interpreted
this Clause, despite ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms
“inadequate” or “ineffective.”124 As a result, the circuit courts have
developed different methodologies for determining whether the
Savings Clause allows a prisoner to seek collateral review under
Section 2241.125

120

See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v.
Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)).
121
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1125.
122
Id.
123
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
124
Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 2002).
125
Case, supra note 33, at 15.
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The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is best understood by
reviewing its noteworthy decisions. The first of these decisions as well
as the one providing the most comprehensive discussion of the
Savings Clause is In Re Davenport.126 In Davenport, a federal prisoner
was convicted of the use of a firearm in the commission of a drug
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because he was in possession of a
firearm during the offense.127 After his conviction, Davenport sought
relief under Section 2255.128 His request was denied.129 Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court held that the “use” of a firearm within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) did not include mere possession, as
had been the law when Davenport was convicted.130 However,
Davenport was barred from filing a successive motion under Section
2255(h) because he was unable to present newly discovered evidence
of innocence of the offense, or a new Supreme Court constitutional
ruling.131 As a result, Davenport was prevented from challenging the
legality of his sentence under Section 2255, even though the
retroactive Supreme Court decision, if applied, could have proven that
Davenport had not committed the crime for which he was
convicted.132 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Section
2255 provided an inadequate remedy and thereby allowed Davenport
to bring a habeas corpus petition under Section 2241.133 This ruling
provided Davenport with the opportunity to argue that his sentence
was now improper in light of the Supreme Court’s new interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).134

126

Webster, 784 F.3d at 1135–36.
In Re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 610.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 610–12.
134
Id.
127
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In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit established that
three conditions must be present for the Savings Clause to apply.135
First, the prisoner must show that he relies on a change in law that has
recently been made retroactive by the Supreme Court, such that he
could not have invoked this law as the basis for his initial Section
2255 motion.136 Second, the change in law must be a change that
“eludes the permission in Section 2255(h) for successive motions.”137
In other words, the prisoner must show that he relies on a new or
differing interpretation of a statute rather than a new interpretation of
the Constitution.138 After all, if a new rule of constitutional law is
made retroactive by the Supreme Court, then the prisoner would be
able to initiate a successive Section 2255 motion under Section
2255(h), and, thus, the remedy under Section 2255 would be
adequate.139 Third, the prisoner must show “a fundamental defect in
his conviction or sentence.”140 As a final point, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the “change in law” cannot be the result of a difference in
law between the circuit where the prisoner was sentenced and the
circuit in which he is imprisoned.141
The Seventh Circuit has applied these conditions in later cases to
guide their Savings Clause analysis, with varied results.142 Cases that
were decided in the wake of Davenport employed a narrow
interpretation of the Savings Clause, limiting its application to those
prisoners asserting claims of actual innocence.143 Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit repeatedly stated that “§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only

135

Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).
Davenport, 719 F.3d at 611.
137
Id.
138
Brown, 719 F.3d at 586.
139
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
140
Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611.
141
Id. at 612.
142
See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015)
143
See Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002); Unthank v. Jett,
549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008).
136

74

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

when a prisoner is unable to present a claim of actual innocence.”144
By way of illustration, in Taylor v. Gilkey, the Seventh Circuit declined
to apply the Savings Clause when a federal prisoner invoked it in an
attempt to reduce his prison sentence.145 The prisoner in Taylor did not
plead innocent of the underlying crime.146 Instead, he argued that his
sentence was erroneously elevated as a result of ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial.147 Similarly, in Unthank v. Jett, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed a prisoner’s habeas petition under Section 2241 because the
prisoner did not claim to be innocent of the actual crime; he merely
claimed that the sentence imposed was too high.148
However, in Brown v. Caraway, the Seventh Circuit shifted
towards a broader interpretation of the Savings Clause.149 The federal
prisoner in Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon.150 He was thereafter
sentenced as a career offender in accordance with the sentencing
guidelines.151 The prisoner initially challenged his sentence pursuant
to Section 2255(a) on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.152
After this motion was denied, the prisoner invoked the Savings Clause
and filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.153 The
prisoner argued that he was entitled to a reduction in his sentence in
light of a new Supreme Court decision, Begay v. United States, that
called into question his classification as a career offender.154
144

See, e.g., Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835; Unthank, 549 F.3d at 536.
314 F.3d at 834.
146
Id. at 836.
147
Id.
148
549 F.3d at 536.
149
See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing
Brown v. Caraway as a case where the Court applied a “broader understanding” of
the Savings Clause).
150
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 584 (7th. Cir. 2013).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
145
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In determining the applicability of the Savings Clause in Brown,
the Seventh Circuit noted that “the text of the Clause focuses on the
legality of the prisoner’s detention.”155 “It does not limit its scope to
testing the legality of the underlying criminal conviction.”156 In other
words, Savings Clause relief is not solely limited to prisoners asserting
claims of actual innocence.157 Accordingly, a federal prisoner may
“utilize the Savings Clause” to challenge the legality of his sentence,
provided that he or she satisfies the conditions set forth by
Davenport.158
The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that these conditions were
fulfilled, and, therefore, the court permitted the federal prisoner,
Brown, to pursue traditional habeas relief under Section 2241.159 The
first condition was satisfied because Brown relied on a statutory
interpretation case to challenge the legality of his sentence, not a
constitutional case.160 After all, Brown argued that he was entitled to a
reduced sentence in light of Begay v. United States, a case that called
into question the validity of his classification as a career offender
under federal law—the very classification that led to his increased
prison sentence in the first place.161 Brown also successfully
demonstrated that he could not have relied on Begay in his initial
Section 2255 motion because it had not been decided at the time his
motion was heard, thereby satisfying Davenport’s second
prerequisite.162 Lastly, the misapplication of the sentencing guidelines
based on Brown’s unwarranted classification as a career offender

155

Id. at 588.
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 596.
160
Id. at 586.
161
Id.
162
Id.
156
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yielded a “fundamental defect” in his sentence.163 In other words, his
sentence was unjustly increased.164
B. The Majority Opinion in Webster v. Daniels
The Seventh Circuit further expanded this complex body of case
law with its recent decision in Webster v. Daniels. In Webster, a
divided en banc court held that the Savings Clause permitted Webster
to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.165 The
court, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Wood, offered two
reasons for its conclusion.
The Seventh Circuit first relied on the language of 28 U.S.C. §
2255 to support its holding.166 Section 2255 motions are available to
federal prisoners “claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.”167 Thus, this statute allows federal prisoners to
challenge the legality of a sentence on the basis of a flaw in the
underlying conviction.168 It also allows federal prisoners to challenge a
sentence that is unlawful “because of a constitutional or statutory rule
pertaining to sentences.”169 The majority therefore contended that the
Savings Clause, in the same vein, allows a federal prisoner to
challenge the legality of his sentence (and not just his conviction)
under Section 2241,170 a familiar holding initially set forth by the
Seventh Circuit in Brown v. Caraway.171 According to the majority, the

163

Id.
Id. at 587–88.
165
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1138 (7th Cir. 2015).
166
Id.
167
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
168
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
164
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language of the statute alone “leads directly to the result that the
Savings Clause should apply here.”172
Second, the majority reasoned that relief under the Savings Clause
is appropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v.
Virginia.173 Recall that in Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution prohibits the execution of mentally disabled persons.174
Thus, according to the majority, an unconstitutional punishment will
result if the Savings Clause does not apply.175 Indeed, Webster, an
allegedly mentally challenged person, would be executed since his
appeals have been exhausted. This is sufficient reason, in the
majority’s opinion, to allow Webster the opportunity to file a Section
2241 petition for habeas corpus relief.176
Thus, with this decision, the majority established a new rule: that
a federal prisoner may present newly discovered evidence pursuant to
Section 2241 where the new evidence may reveal that the Constitution
prohibits the penalty imposed upon the prisoner.177 However, the
majority was quick to limit this rule, fearing that the implementation
of a broad rule would eliminate any degree of finality in capital cases
involving intellectually disabled persons.178 Accordingly, newly
discovered evidence may be presented via Section 2241 only if: (1) the
evidence existed before the time of the original trial; (2) the evidence
was not available during the original trial despite diligent efforts by
counsel; and (3) the evidence would purportedly show that the
prisoner is constitutionally ineligible for the sentence he received.179
The prisoner must make a prima facie showing of these three elements
172

Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139.
Id. at 1138.
174
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
175
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139.
176
See id. at 1139.
177
Id. at 1140.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1140–41; see also A New Route for Post-Conviction Sentencing
Challenges, MILLER, SHAKMAN & BEEM (June 2015), http://millershakman.com/anew-route-for-post-conviction-sentencing-challenges/.
173
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in order to proceed with a Section 2241 petition on the merits.180 If the
prisoner successfully makes this showing, he may introduce the new
evidence at a merits hearing.181 The government, in turn, will have the
opportunity to refute this evidence and present its own.182 The
prisoner, as the petitioner, bears the burden of proof; that burden being
a preponderance of the evidence.183 It is then up to the district court to
decide, as a matter of fact, whether the prisoner is constitutionally
ineligible for the sentence in light of all the evidence.184
The Seventh Circuit applied this new standard in Webster’s
case.185 First, the court concluded that the evidence that Webster now
seeks to offer would be used to prove that Webster is constitutionally
ineligible for the death penalty on the basis of an intellectual
disability.186 Second, this new evidence reveals that Webster was
evaluated by the Social Security Administration and deemed “mentally
retarded” by an Administration psychologist a year before the crime in
question occurred.187 The evidence therefore existed before the time of
trial. Finally, the court noted that, although the facts are disputed, there
is evidence suggesting that these records were not available to Webster
during the initial trial as a result of missteps by the Social Security
Administration, not Webster’s counsel.188 Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that Webster was eligible under its new standard to
seek relief under Section 2241 as a matter of law.189
Whether or not Webster should be granted this relief as a matter of
fact, however, is debatable. After all, the parties contest whether the
evidence Webster now seeks to present was indeed unavailable to
180

Webster, 784 F.3d at 1141.
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1146.
184
Id. at 1141.
185
Id. at 1140.
186
Id. at 1141.
187
Id. at 1133.
188
Id. at 1140.
189
Id. at 1145.
181

79

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/4

22

Evans: Post-Conviction Relief: The Seventh Circuit Applies Savings Claus

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

Webster and his counsel at the initial trial.190 Webster’s counsel argued
that its pre-trial request for these records went unanswered.191 The
government, on the other argued that any failure to receive the records
was attributable to Webster’s counsel.192 In any event, it is currently
unknown to the court whether Webster’s counsel ever followed up
with the Social Security Administration on his records request or if the
Administration deliberately or accidentally failed to provide these
records.193 In light of this uncertainty, the Seventh Circuit decided to
remand the case to the district court to resolve these issues of fact.194 If
the district court determined that the records were unavailable and all
reasonable diligence was exercised by counsel to obtain them, then
Webster’s habeas corpus petition will be decided on the strength of his
evidence.195
C. The Dissenting Opinion in Webster v. Daniels
The dissent’s opinion of the majority’s holding in Webster v.
Daniels can effectively be summed up by one short sentence: “The
majority concluded that Section 2255 provides inadequate or
ineffective relief to Webster simply because it prevents Webster from
presenting the particular argument he now wants to make.”196 Indeed,
the dissent, in an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, vehemently
argued that the majority does not provide sufficient legal justification
for its invocation of the Savings Clause.197
The dissent first attacked the textual analysis offered by the
majority.198 Recall that the majority argued that the language of the
190

Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1142.
192
Id. at 1141.
193
Id. at 1142.
194
Id. at 1146.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 1148 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
197
See id. at 1147–52.
198
See id. at 1150.
191
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statute supports the application of the Savings Clause to challenge an
unlawful sentence.199 The dissent recognized that the language of
Section 2255 as a whole covers convictions as well as sentences, but
questions how this language “justifies using [the Savings Clause] to
escape from § 2255 altogether?”200 Certainly, Webster was able to, and
did, in fact, use Section 2255 to make an argument that he is
constitutionally ineligible for capital punishment.201 The fact that this
argument was rejected on the merits does not, by itself, render Section
2255 “inadequate or ineffective.”202
The dissent then calls into question the majority’s reliance on
Atkins v. Virginia.203 The dissent contended that Atkins did not alter the
substantive standard set forth by 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), in effect at the
time Webster was sentenced to death.204 Indeed, the statute made it
unlawful to impose the death penalty upon a person suffering from a
mental disability.205 The Supreme Court, in Atkins, later held that the
Constitution establishes this same rule.206 Thus, according to the
dissent, there is no basis for another round of collateral review when
the substantive rule is unchanged.207
ANALYSIS
This Part will argue that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided
Webster v. Daniels. In support of this conclusion, I will first argue that
the Seventh Circuit’s decision to allow Webster to file a successive
habeas corpus petition is not supported by relevant Seventh Circuit
precedent. I will then argue that the justifications offered by the
199

Id. at 1138 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1150 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c).
206
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1147 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
207
Id. at 1151.
200
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Seventh Circuit are inadequate to invoke the Savings Clause in
Webster’s case. Finally, I will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
raises significant policy concerns; indeed, the decision is contrary to
the objective of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Webster v. Daniels is not
supported by relevant Savings Clause jurisprudence.
The Seventh Circuit has developed a body of case law discussing
circumstances that justify the application of the Savings Clause. This
body of case law indicates that the Seventh Circuit has only invoked
the Savings Clause when the remedy provided by Section 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective as a result of a structural problem created by
the statute itself.208
The Seventh Circuit identified this type of structural problem in
Davenport, where the prisoner sought to rely on a new statutory
interpretation made retroactive by the Supreme Court.209 This new
interpretation would have allowed the prisoner to establish innocence
of the underlying crime for which he was convicted.210 However, the
prisoner was barred from challenging the legality of his sentence under
Section 2255.211 He had already utilized his initial Section 2255
motion and was unable to satisfy either of the requirements necessary
to obtain certification of a successive motion under Section 2255(h),
as the statute only allows new rules of constitutional law (not statutory
law) to be presented for certification.212 Consequently, the prisoner
was without the ability to obtain a remedy under Section 2255, even
though a Supreme Court decision binding on federal courts would
have granted him relief.213 In other words, the prisoner was unable to
obtain the habeas corpus relief to which he was entitled because of a
208

See id. at 1136 (majority opinion).
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 607.
212
Id. at 610.
213
See id.
209
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defect in the structure of Section 2255. To cure this deficiency, the
Seventh Circuit permitted the prisoner to bring a habeas corpus
petition under Section 2241.214
The Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of a similar
structural problem in Brown v. Caraway. In this case, the prisoner was
convicted of drug and weapons charges, and classified as a “career
offender” under mandatory sentencing guidelines.215 A higher sentence
was imposed as a result of this classification.216 The prisoner
unsuccessfully challenged his sentence under Section 2255.217 After
this motion was denied, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. U.S.;218
this case offered a new interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.219
The prisoner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Seventh
Circuit pursuant to Section 2241, arguing that under Begay, he could
not be classified as a career offender, and accordingly, his sentence
should be reduced.220
The Seventh Circuit authorized the prisoner to pursue a habeas
petition under Section 2241.221 The court acknowledged that without
resorting to Section 2241, the prisoner would be unable to obtain
relief.222 The prisoner would not be afforded relief under Section 2255
because he had already exhausted his initial Section 2255 motion.223
Additionally, any request for a successive motion under Section
2255(h) would have been denied because the prisoner did not seek to
present newly discovered evidence of his innocence, or rely on a new
constitutional ruling.224 Yet again, the structural confines of
214

Id. at 610–12.
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2013).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
533 U.S. 137 (2008).
219
Brown, 719 F.3d at 586.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See id. at 585.
224
See id. at 586.
215
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Section 2255 prevented the prisoner from obtaining habeas relief. The
Seventh Circuit recognized this limitation, and accordingly, allowed
resort to Section 2241.
Both of these decisions indicate that “there must be some kind of
structural problem with Section 2255 before Section 2241 becomes
available.”225 That is, “something more than a lack of success with a
section 2255 must exist before the savings clause is satisfied.”226
While the Seventh Circuit acknowledged this binding precedent in
Webster v. Daniels, the court failed to abide by it in reaching its
decision. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit did not and cannot justify
invocation of the Savings Clause in Webster’s case on the basis of a
structural problem inherent in Section 2255. Webster did not assert a
claim of innocence of the underlying crime based on a change in the
law, like the defendant in Davenport.227 Nor did Webster contend that
a change in the law entitles him to a reduced sentence.228 Rather,
Webster sought to present “newly” discovered evidence of his mental
competency that would allegedly demonstrate ineligibility for the
death penalty.229 Webster contended that this evidence, though in
existence at the time of trial, was not made available to him, despite a
request by his attorney.230 Webster thus argued that a Section 2241
petition was necessary in order to remedy this problem.231
However, any problem with obtaining this evidence prior to trial,
by the Seventh Circuit’s own admission, is attributable to either the
custodian of the records or Webster’s attorneys, not the structure of
Section 2255.232 Wherever the fault lies, Section 2255 provides an
adequate remedy. Indeed, if Webster’s former counsel is to blame,
relief under Section 2255 is available on the grounds of ineffective
225

Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
227
See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
228
See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
229
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1132.
230
Id. at 1133.
231
See id.
232
See id. at 1142.
226
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assistance of counsel.233 In fact, the most common issue raised in a
Section 2255 motion is ineffective assistance of counsel.234 Section
2255 also provides prisoners with an effective means of claiming that
material evidence has been withheld in violation of Brady v.
Maryland.235 Circuit courts hear and resolve these types of claims
under Section 2255 frequently.236 Webster could have raised either of
these arguments on his initial Section 2255 motion.237 Certainly,
Webster’s attorneys would have known in 2005, when the initial
Section 2255 petition was made, that records requested in 1998 were
never received.238 The fact that Webster failed to present these
arguments on an earlier motion, though unfortunate, does not justify
giving him the opportunity to do so now. After all, pursuant to the
Savings Clause, “an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief pursuant to this
section shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has
failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him.”239
Accordingly, the Savings Clause cannot be applied to allow a
prisoner to make up for his own (or in all likelihood, his counsel’s)
lack of diligence. There must be a structural problem that would
foreclose collateral review under Section 2255.240 The Seventh Circuit,
however, did not follow its own precedent when it decided Webster v.
Daniels. The court decided to apply a far broader interpretation of the
Savings Clause than that contained in Davenport and its progeny
without any real justification for doing so.
233

See id. at 1151 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: APPEAL, 16A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 41.445 (2015).
234
Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients and Colleagues Collide:
The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
347, 347 (2009).
235
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1151 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).
240
Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2013).
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B. The Seventh Circuit does not offer sufficient legal justification for
applying the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels.
The Seventh Circuit set forth two justifications in support of its
holding that the Savings Clause permits Webster to file a habeas
corpus petition pursuant to Section 2241. I will explore the validity of
these justifications in the following section, ultimately concluding that
these justifications fail to support the application of the Savings Clause
in Webster v. Daniels.
1. The language of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not justify application
of the Savings Clause in Webster v. Daniels.
The first justification is that the language of the statute itself
allows Webster to bring a traditional habeas corpus petition.241 The
Seventh Circuit contended that Section 2255 is the vehicle whereby
federal prisoners may challenge both their sentences and underlying
convictions.242 The Savings Clause, specifically, focuses on the
legality of the prisoner’s detention243 and, therefore, applies when the
remedy provided by Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.”244 That is, the Savings Clause
may be invoked to allow a federal prisoner to file a writ of habeas
corpus under Section 2241 even if the prisoner only wishes to
challenge his sentence.
However, it is hardly a novel concept that challenges to a prison
sentence (rather than just the underlying conviction) can be brought
under Section 2241. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has previously
applied the Savings Clause to allow a federal prisoner to attack his
sentence under Section 2241.245 In fact, the Seventh Circuit has
241

Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138 (majority opinion).
Id.
243
Id.
244
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
245
See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
242
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explicitly stated that the Savings Clause may be used to attack the
legality of a prison sentence.246 So, while in Webster the Seventh
Circuit correctly states that the Savings Clause allows federal
prisoners to challenge the legality of their sentences, all the court has
done is reiterate a familiar holding. The Seventh Circuit did not offer a
compelling reason why the Savings Clause should be applied to allow
Mr. Webster, or prisoners like him, to resort to a petition under Section
2241. The court only stated that the Savings Clause allows for
collateral review of a federal sentence under Section 2241. This
statement alone cannot justify application of the Savings Clause.
2. The Savings Clause cannot be invoked to present a constitutional
argument that was previously heard and decided on them
merits.
The Seventh Circuit secondarily relies on the fact that Atkins v.
Virginia was decided after Webster was convicted and sentenced to
death to support its application of the Savings Clause in Webster v.
Daniels.247 Recall that in Atkins, the Supreme Court established that
the Constitution forbids the execution of mentally disabled persons.248
It is the Seventh Circuit’s contention that because Webster did not
have the benefit of arguing that he was constitutionally ineligible for
the death penalty under Atkins at his sentencing and on direct appeal,
he should be able to do so now.249 This argument would certainly be
persuasive if Webster never had the opportunity to argue categorical
ineligibility pursuant to Atkins, but he did.
After all, Webster made the exact same argument in his initial
Section 2255 motion, and it was rejected by the Fifth Circuit on the
grounds that there was little difference between the governing
standards in 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) and the Constitution.250 Indeed, the
246

Id.
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1138–39.
248
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
249
See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1139.
250
Id. at 1132.
247
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Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he only substantive change ushered in by
Atkins with respect to federal capital [prisoners] is the recognition of a
new source of federal law (i.e. constitutional) that bars their
execution.”251 Thus, the trial court’s decision that Webster was an
eligible candidate for the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3596
applied with equal force under Atkins; that is, a different result was not
warranted due to the decision in Atkins.252
However, the Seventh Circuit seemed to forget this relevant
procedural history. Instead, the court invoked Atkins to give Webster
another bite at the apple, without any explanation as to why Atkins
justified the filing of a successive collateral attack. This decision begs
the question: why should Webster get another chance to present the
same argument he presented to the Fifth Circuit, an argument in which
he received a decision on the merits by the Fifth Circuit?253
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit did concede that the Savings
Clause would not apply if Atkins had never been decided.254 According
to the majority, the argument that Webster now has new evidence that
would demonstrate that a federal statute (i.e., Section 3596(c)) would
be violated by his execution would not be enough to trigger the
Savings Clause.255 Yet, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless asserted that
Atkins, which sets forth the same legal standard codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3596(c), justifies subsequent collateral review in Webster’s case.
These statements yield a conflicting conclusion.
The Seventh Circuit attempted to alleviate this confusion in a
footnote, in which it is explained that “collateral review is primarily
used for constitutional violations, not violations of federal law that . . .
should be raised on direct appeal.”256 With this statement, the Seventh
Circuit seems to have suggested that collateral review of a prison
sentence is justified when the sentence is imposed in violation of the
251

United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id.
253
See Webster, 784 F.3d at 1151 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
254
Id. at 1139 (majority opinion).
255
Id.
256
Id. at 1139 n.6.
252
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Constitution, but not when the sentence is imposed in violation of a
federal law. However, this explanation only serves to cause further
confusion because the language of the statute—the bedrock of the
Seventh Circuit’s primary justification for application of the Savings
Clause in Webster’s case—provides that a federal prisoner may
challenge his sentence under Section 2255 if it was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.257 So, it
would seem that the statute itself does not recognize a difference
between those collateral attacks made pursuant to the Constitution and
those made pursuant to federal statute, which begs the question: why
should the Seventh Circuit make such a distinction?
C. The precedent set by Webster v. Daniels will lead to results that are
contrary to the intent of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Webster v. Daniels should
be rejected on policy grounds. Indeed, the decision to allow Webster to
file a successive collateral review in the Seventh Circuit directly
conflicts with the intended purpose of Section 2255. Recall that
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to solve venue problems created
by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which required a federal prisoner
to file his writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court with
jurisdiction over his place of confinement.258 This venue requirement
flooded those federal courts whose jurisdiction included federal
prisons with numerous habeas corpus petitions.259 It also created a
“physical-proximity problem” since federal courts with habeas
jurisdiction were often a substantial distance from the relevant
witnesses and evidence.260 Section 2255 was intended “to disperse the
caseload associated with collateral attacks and to ensure that postconviction proceedings were conducted closer to the relevant records
and witnesses” by requiring federal prisoners to challenge their
257

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).
Case, supra note 30, at 175.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 176.
258
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sentences in the court which imposed that sentence.261 In addition to
“matching the litigation with the court possessing the record,” Section
2255 also “ensures that only one court of appeals will be involved.”262
However, the Seventh Circuit seems to undermine these
objectives by allowing Webster to seek habeas corpus relief in the
jurisdiction of his incarceration. So, not only does Webster potentially
have another opportunity to challenge his death sentence, he also has
the added benefit of challenging it in a new jurisdiction, one that has
already proven favorable to him. This is particularly problematic for
several reasons. First, as indicated by the dissent, the Seventh Circuit
is home to the only federal correctional facility housing death row
inmates.263 As a result, all habeas corpus petitions brought pursuant to
Section 2241 (by virtue of Savings Clause application) will be heard
by the Seventh Circuit.264 This effectively gives the Seventh Circuit
“final say about the propriety of every federal death sentence.”265 Is it
wise to create a system in which one circuit is deciding the fate of all
death row inmates?
Relatedly, the decision in Webster may also facilitate conflict
among federal circuits.266 After all, due to application of the Savings
Clause in Webster, a district court in the Seventh Circuit will now be
reviewing a case that was previously considered by the Fifth Circuit.
This opens the door for circuit courts to contradict each other in the
same case.267 One must ask whether it is prudent to adopt a policy
whereby circuit courts have the ability to undermine the decisions of
their sister circuits. Such a policy may lead to invocation of the
Savings Clause in order to procure a more “favorable” circuit. It may
also create bad blood among the circuits, especially if the Seventh
261

Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1147 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
263
Id. at 1149.
264
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1147.
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See id.
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Circuit has final review over all habeas petitions, even those that
originated in other circuits.
CONCLUSION
An interest in the finality of judgment in the criminal process has
led to limited post-conviction relief. Indeed, prisoners seeking to
challenge the legality of their sentences or convictions only have one
opportunity to do so as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
Savings Clause is oftentimes the only recourse for a federal prisoner
who seeks to obtain subsequent collateral review of his sentence or
conviction. The Seventh Circuit has historically interpreted this Clause
to allow successive collateral review for federal prisoners only when a
structural problem inherent in the statute forecloses effective review.
However, the Seventh Circuit significantly and unjustifiably
broadened this interpretation with its decision in Webster v. Daniels. In
Webster, the Seventh Circuit applied the Savings Clause to allow a
federal prisoner to pursue a successive collateral attack on his death
sentence on the basis that “newly discovered” evidence would render
the sentence unconstitutional. This conclusion is inconsistent with
relevant Seventh Circuit Savings Clause jurisprudence; is not
supported by sufficient legal justification; and is contrary to the
purpose and objective of the Savings Clause.

91

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/4

34

